Whereas a nation like Canada has followed a relatively smooth and democratic road from its earliest days as a nation, Chile, like many South American nations, has had a much more volatile history. Using the “focus for reading” questions in italics below, consider the major reasons why Chile has struggled more than Canada to become the prosperous nation it is today.

From Independence to the Election of 1970
How have geography and European history played a role in the history of Chile? How did a class system, global economics, and a shifting political spectrum contribute to its changeable nature?

Chile is a long, narrow strip of territory that stretches 4260 kilometres along the Pacific coast of South America, from Peru all the way to Antarctica. At no point does the distance from east to west exceed 267 kilometres. The high Andes mountains form a natural border with Chile’s eastern neighbours, Bolivia and Argentina. The inhabitants of this unusually shaped country number just over 14 million, almost all of whom speak Spanish and claim descent from the indigenous population, Spanish colonists, and later European immigrants. Only a small number of pure-blooded native people remain in Chile today. Chile’s economy is based on the mining of valuable minerals like copper and agricultural products such as fruits and vegetables. Fishing is also important.

Along with many South American states, Chile won its freedom from Spanish colonial rule in 1818. Unlike most of its neighbours, however, it was able to institute and preserve a constitutional system of government and avoid the cycle of military coups and dictatorships that was all-too-common in other parts of Latin America. For most of the 19th century, a small and privileged oligarchy of landowners and merchants, supported by the Roman Catholic Church and the army, dominated the nation’s affairs. But during this time Chile was ruled by civilian governments that gradually accepted the incorporation of middle- and working-class groups into the country’s political scene.

In 1925, a constitution was proclaimed that would remain in force until the military coup of 1973. It established a strong presidential system, separated church and state, and granted democratic and labour rights to Chile’s workers. Alarmed by the growing militancy of the trade union movement, the military seized power in 1927, but was forced to hand it back to civilian authorities following the onset of the Great Depression in 1931. From the 1930s to 1973, Chile’s democratic political system flourished, and was marked by the mainly peaceful competition between parties representing the right, centre, and left positions on the political spectrum.

The conservative forces drew most of their support from the traditional elite groups and religiously inclined voters. Chile’s rapidly growing urban middle class of business and professional people tended to vote for moderate reformist parties. For their part, Chile’s urban and rural workers were generally loyal to the country’s socialist and communist parties. During most of this period, coalitions of the centre held power, allied sometimes with the right and sometimes with the left. Economic and social policies that favoured the protection of domestic industries from foreign competition and the promotion of education, health care, and other welfare measures, were followed. Unlike most of Latin America, Chile appeared to foreign observers as an almost Western European democracy, a “compromise state” where all of the major political forces accepted the basic rules of the game and did not follow extremist or divisive policies.

The Move to the Left
What is unique about how the balance of power in Chilean society shifted during the Allende period?

All this was to change, however, following the victory of the Socialist leader Salvador Allende in the presidential election of 1970. Allende was a veteran of Chilean politics, and had held legislative and cabinet positions in various governments since the 1930s. In 1958 and 1964 he had run for president but lost to centrist opponents, but in 1970 a three-way split in the presidential vote allowed him to win with barely 38 per cent of the ballots. Nonetheless, Allende’s coalition of radical, socialist, and communist groups known as the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) was eager to assume power and lead Chile in a pronounced left-wing direction.

Allende was a Marxist who planned to initiate a radical transformation of Chilean society. He wanted to end foreign control of Chile’s major resource industries that were owned and operated by U.S. multinational corporations by nationalizing them. He also was determined to extend social welfare programs like health care, education, housing, and labour rights to Chile’s working-class majority, which formed the backbone of his political support. But he was also a committed democrat, who intended to introduce his reforms through legal and constitutional channels. Unlike his friend the Cuban Communist leader Fidel Castro, Allende had no wish to end Chile’s system of multiparty democracy, seize control of the army, or restrict the basic political freedoms of his opponents.

To those Chileans whose allegiance lay with the Unidad Popular, Allende was a beloved leader, nicknamed “compañero Presidente” (comrade President). He appeared to them as the only politician in their nation’s history who was truly concerned with alleviating their poverty and raising them to a level of dignity they had previously been denied. But to the members of the wealthy upper class, and also to a growing number of anxious middle-class Chileans, Allende’s radical policies were very disturbing. Pressured from the left wing of his coalition to move even more swiftly to introduce socialism, and increasingly under attack from those on the right and the centre who feared he was moving too far, too fast, Allende’s government soon found itself facing a series of political and economic crises.

International Intervention
Why was this shift to the left of concern to the United States? How did this have an impact on Chilean politics? What was the U.S. rationale for intervening in the politics of another nation?

Meanwhile, in Washington, the administration of President Richard Nixon watched with growing anxiety as Allende pursued what Chile’s president called “the Chilean road to socialism.” Ignoring his commitment to democracy, the United States publicly denounced Allende as another Fidel Castro who wanted to turn Chile into a pro-Soviet communist satellite. Privately, however, U.S. officials in the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) feared the example Allende’s Chile might represent for the other countries of Latin America. If a Marxist could win a free election and succeed in transforming his country into a democratic socialist state with better living conditions for the impoverished majority of its citizens, then people all over the continent might want to follow his lead. Such a development would place valuable U.S.-owned economic interests at risk, and thus could not be allowed to happen.

Even before Allende was sworn in as President of Chile in 1970, the U.S. government allegedly lent a hand to forces within the country who wanted to prevent a socialist government from taking office. Attempts to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote against Allende, and the kidnapping and murder of the army Commander-in-Chief both failed to stop Allende’s inauguration as President. During the three years Allende governed Chile, U.S. economic aid, trade, and development loans dwindled to a trickle, while financial assistance to the mainly anticommunist armed forces continued to be generous.

In 1971, the Chilean congress unanimously passed Allende’s bill to nationalize the U.S.-owned copper companies. For Nixon, who had once publicly referred to Allende as “that sonofabitch,” this was the last straw. The economic screws were tightened further, as the U.S. imposed an embargo on products entering Chile. As U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry said at the time, “not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende.” Soon shortages of manufactured goods appeared, causing serious bottlenecks in the economy, especially in the transportation sector, because of a scarcity of spare parts for trucks. Unemployment remained low because of government-sponsored infrastructure programs for the workers, whose wages and social benefits had also been increased. But inflation rose to dramatic levels, fuelled largely by massive devaluations in the Chilean peso, and the subsequent flight of foreign capital. This hurt mainly middle-class consumers whose lifestyles depended to a great extent on imported goods. Soon demonstrations against Allende’s government broke out in middle and upper-class areas of the country, many of them assisted and even funded by the CIA. These were intended to reveal the lack of public support for Allende among Chile’s people.

Despite the vocal opposition to his government, Allende’s supporters were delighted when the mid-term congressional elections in March 1973 revealed that the Unidad Popular had increased its support from 38 per cent to 44 per cent. Any hopes the opposition parties had entertained about winning enough legislative seats to impeach the President were now dashed, and Allende announced that he would continue down the democratic Chilean road to socialism in spite of domestic and foreign hostility. It was at this moment that senior officers in the Chilean armed forces, along with wealthy business executives and their U.S. contacts, decided that Allende’s government would have to be brought down by force. As U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had stated, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.”

The Coup and its Aftermath
How does the theme of “betrayal” play a large role in this period of Chile’s history? Who was betrayed? What principles were betrayed? Why would some disagree as to the nature of the betrayal?

Early on the morning of September 11, 1973, Chilean Air Force jets took off from their bases. Their target was La Moneda, the Presidential palace in downtown Santiago, the nation’s capital. Inside that massive building, Salvador Allende and a group of his supporters staged their last stand in defence of their socialist dreams and Chilean democracy. In his final radio address to his people, as the bombs fell all around him, Allende condemned the military leaders for betraying their oath of loyalty to the Chilean constitution. But he also assured his listeners that whatever happened to him, he was confident that one day democracy and socialism would both return to their country. Hours later, Allende lay dead. Whether he had committed suicide, as the military would later claim, or had been killed while fighting, as many believed, remains a mystery to this day.

Throughout his three years in power, Allende had consistently rejected pressure from the left-wing of his coalition to dismantle the traditional military authorities and replace them with a “people’s defence force” of armed workers whose loyalty to the Unidad Popular could be assured. This proved to be his undoing that bloody September as Chile’s military leader, General Augusto Pinochet, easily crushed the sporadic armed opposition that erupted in some working-class areas. Within days, the army was in full control of the country. Thousands of supporters of Allende’s government, including elected members of Congress, trade union leaders, journalists, and others were rounded up and deposited in Santiago’s cavernous soccer stadium. From there, many were dispatched to secret locations where they were put to death. Working-class quarters were encircled by troops, and a house-to-house search for dissidents and left-wing books and newspapers was initiated. People were seized in their homes and on the street and hauled off to be tortured and killed. Women wearing pants had their trouser legs cut by soldiers who informed them that “in the new Chile, women wear dresses.”

No one really knows the total number of Chileans who lost their lives in the aftermath of Pinochet’s violent coup. Years later, after democracy had been restored, an official figure of 3000 “disappeared” persons, that is, those who had vanished without a trace after being seized by the military, was announced. But many inside and outside the country believe that the total number was far higher. People were thrown alive from army helicopters into the Pacific Ocean. Babies born to women in detention were given to childless families with military connections after their mothers were tortured and killed. The coup in Chile was one of the bloodiest and most barbaric in Latin American history. With all opposition crushed, Allende’s supporters either dead, imprisoned, in exile, or in hiding, and Chile’s democracy in ruins, Pinochet was able to begin his overhaul of the country’s major economic, social, and political institutions. The Chilean road to socialism had proved to be a dead-end, and the new military leaders would now steer their country in a very different direction.

The Pinochet Years
Suggest how fear, a sense of relief, disillusionment, resentment, and misconceptions played interconnected roles during this period in Chile’s history.

It is quite likely that many middle and upper-class Chileans who had opposed Allende’s socialist policies and feared the growing political unrest in the country at first welcomed the military coup. But as time went by, even those who had cheered Allende’s overthrow became disillusioned with the rigid authoritarianism of Pinochet’s regime. Any expression of opposition to the military was immediately suppressed, and the country’s once-thriving free press was silenced. However, middle-class resentment over the loss of democracy was at least to some extent assuaged by the dramatic economic reforms Pinochet and his advisors introduced. Acting on the advice of a group of University of Chicago economists headed by Prof. Milton Friedman, Pinochet’s regime initiated what was probably the world’s first experiment in what would later come to be known as “government restructuring and downsizing.” Companies nationalized under Allende were privatized, spending on health, education, and social programs was slashed, labour unions were suppressed, and wages and benefits for workers were cut drastically.

Pinochet’s regime was helped by an immediate resumption of U.S. economic aid and development loans. In addition, Chile’s new rulers found that markets for their country’s exports, scarce under Allende, were now open. As a result, Chile’s economy began to show signs of growth as trade expanded, prices and exchange rates stabilized, and government deficits shrank. Foreign economic experts flocked to Chile to observe and praise what they came to refer to as the “Chilean economic miracle.” What they usually overlooked, however, were staggering rates of unemployment, rising levels of infant mortality and malnutrition, and a widening income gap between the minority of Chileans who benefitted from Pinochet’s economic reforms and the large majority who found themselves left behind.

After a “controlled plebiscite” in 1980, regarded by most foreign observers as a farce, Pinochet institutionalized his rule through a new constitution that would permit him to remain in power until 1988, when another vote would be held. But shortly after, a serious economic downturn cast clouds on the Chilean miracle. Like many other Latin American nations, Chile was hard hit by the recession and debt crisis of the early 1980s. As a result, the once intimidated opposition finally found the courage to take to the streets again in protest against Pinochet’s regime. While the economy showed some signs of recovery by 1985, the scale of demonstrations against Pinochet continued to grow. Narrowly escaping an assassination attempt by the leftist Miguel Rodriguez Patriotic Front in 1986, a shaken Pinochet again faced the voters in 1988.

This time, Chileans had the opportunity to vote in a fair election, and by a convincing majority, they cast their ballots against the dictator. Subsequent elections for a new president and congress were held a year later, and Pinochet grudgingly handed over power to the nation’s new leader, Patricio Aylwin of the moderate Christian Democratic Party. However, Pinochet was to remain head of Chile’s armed forces for another 10 years.

The Difficult Transition to Democracy
As we have seen in nations such as South Africa, “truth and reconciliation” are vital but problematic steps in the restoration of democracy in a country that has known civil strife. To what extent has this been achieved in Chile?

Chile’s new democratic leaders faced a daunting task as they assumed power after Pinochet’s departure. Many Chileans were eager to see democracy restored, along with much-needed social and economic reforms that could benefit those who had suffered deprivation during the years of military rule. They also wanted truth and justice for the victims of human-rights abuses, including torture, rape, and murder—crimes that had occurred under the Pinochet regime. There were demands for a thorough democratic transformation of Chile’s political system that would remove all traces of authoritarianism, and bring the military under full civilian control. But how any of this could be done without provoking the armed forces to stage yet another coup presented the Aylwin government with an almost insurmountable dilemma.

The coalition of parties supporting the new civilian administration decided to move slowly and cautiously. Pinochet’s insistence on a bloc of unelected seats in the Chilean Senate and his retention of the army command for 10 years were both reluctantly conceded. Although some attempts were made to find the truth about the disappeared, the military officials responsible for the widespread torture and murder of their fellow citizens remained free from investigation, let alone punishment. While some limited social welfare measures were introduced to help the poor, the new government feared that too much government spending would swell budget deficits, and frighten the foreign investors whose capital had done so much to revive the nation’s economy.

For some Chileans, the transition to democracy after the long years of military dictatorship has been a welcome relief. The new, more moderate tone of national politics, along with the continuing economic progress the country has made, are both more than enough to compensate for any remaining deficiencies in Chile’s democratic structure and institutions. For others, however, the failure of the new government to bring to trial those responsible for horrific crimes, including Pinochet himself, represents a major disappointment.

Chile’s new president, Eduardo Frei, who was elected in 1996, is the son and namesake of the last president to hold the office before Allende. The elder Eduardo Frei was a man who at first supported the coup but later turned violently against Pinochet. The current government of his son Eduardo is a coalition of centrist and left-wing parties, but has largely continued to follow the cautious policies of its predecessor. Despite any personal feelings he may have against his country’s former commander-in-chief, Frei presided over the ceremony that paid tribute to Pinochet, and refused demands from leftists within his own government to bar Pinochet’s entry into the Congress as an unelected senator-for-life. Pinochet’s new position there will grant him total immunity from any criminal charges arising from the years of the dictatorship until the day of his death.