Anti-Americanism, which may be as old as America in some quarters, has always contained a paradox. America's compelling narrative and freedoms have the capacity both to offend and enchant, often the same person.

But today, the enchantment side is definitely lagging behind. Princeton's Bernard Chazelle puts it bluntly in his recent "clinical study" of anti-Americanism: "Never has the United States been so alienated from the rest of the world."

Several large surveys of global public opinion by such prestigious organisations as the Pew Institute, the German Marshall Fund and GlobeScan (for BBC World) provide dismal reading.

The BBC poll last year asked, "Is the U.S. having a mainly positive influence in the world?" Only 29 per cent of the 25,000 people polled in 25 countries still viewed America's influence as "mainly positive." That's down from 36 per cent in 2005 and against 49 per cent who see U.S. influence as "mainly negative."

Why this matters

It should almost go without saying but successful leadership by the world's sole superpower requires a favourable view of America in the eyes of others. A widely disliked America obviously helps extremists and terrorists to mobilize support.

Some say resentment of the world's "Mr. Big" is inevitable. Rome went through it, as did the British and French empires in their colonial heydays. As French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy said during a recent U.S. visit: "The virulence of the press and a portion of the French elites against the U.S. reflects a certain envy of your success."

But broad generalizations like this don't always get at the full story.

In their new book, "Anti-Americanisms in World Politics", U.S. scholars Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane underline the fact that anti-Americanism is not a single phenomenon.

In fact, they break out four different strands:

a) "liberal anti-Americanism" — those who share American values but see the U.S. pursuing selfish interests and practising double standards;

b) "social anti-Americanism" — advocates of greater social welfare who resent the market primacy of American society;

c) "sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism" — those whose national identity is threatened by so-called Americanization or who have a historic grievance as a result of direct interference, as in Iran, China or parts of Latin America;

d) "radical anti-Americanism" — the most dangerous, which views the U.S. existentially as an evil antagonist, the way Islamic radicals do today, or Marxist-Leninists a few decades ago.

Is it just Iraq?

The other ingredient you have to consider when you are discussing America's place in the world is religion. For example, when Pew asked whether religion played a "very important" role in your life, 59 per cent of Americans said yes.

Only 30 per cent of Canadians said the same and the proportion grew progressively smaller — 11 per cent in France — as you marched through Europe.

Mostly secular societies in Europe have become wary of late of this sense of manifest destiny on the part of faith-based America. And the single-minded pursuit by the Bush administration of its unilateral objectives, as in the case of Iraq, plays right into this growing wariness.

Is America's poor showing all about the mess in Iraq?

There is no question the world has been most vexed by the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq and the subsequent handling of the conflict there. The war has done immense damage to America's once supreme image as the world's leading protagonist of human rights.

And there can be no other rational explanation for the answers to a Pew poll last spring that asked: "Which country do you think is the greatest threat to global safety?"

In almost all countries, the U.S. was ranked the top threat over Iran and China or anyone else. Even in Britain, George W. Bush's erstwhile ally, 40 per cent ranked the U.S. as the greatest threat, followed by Iran at 24 per cent and China at 10.

This is the poll over which President Bush himself showed understandably indignant astonishment at a press conference in Vienna last spring. But he is clearly part of the problem, even if for some reasons not of his making.

It's the president, stupid

In the U.S., George W. Bush, like him or dislike him, is at least a familiar type. Liberals flinch at his Texan style, but it's no novelty, especially for those who remember LBJ.

However, it must be said, Texas doesn't travel well. Foreigners love westerns at the movies, but they don't really get Texas.

Veteran newsman Stanley Karnow recounts in his book Paris in the Fifties that "Westerns were invariably dubbed into French: a cowboy strides into a saloon, slams his fist on the bar and barks 'Gimme a shot of red-eye!' — and, lips flapping, his voice comes out 'Un Dubonnet, s'il vous plait?'"

But there's no way that dubbing can soften Bush messages like "Either you're with us or against us," a challenge to others that clearly backfired.

University of Michigan political scientist Andrei Markovits doesn't mince words in writing that Europeans see Bush as "arrogant, uncouth, uncultured, ignorant, inconsiderate, and aggressive," in short, as the "quintessential ugly American."

But wait! If it really is mostly about Bush and Iraq, won't these negative perceptions about America change in 22 months? Maybe not.

It's more than the president, stupid

A report from the Princeton University Working Group on Anti-Americanism urges caution: "America's image problem is increasingly much bigger than its current administration." But what does that mean exactly?

The polls do show that people around the world also object to America's actions or views on global warming, Guantanamo detainees, Iran and the recent Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon.

Overall Israeli-Palestinian issues seem to have a special resonance.

Writing in Foreign Affairs in 2003, John Waterbury, the president of the American University of Beirut, ("Hate Your Policies, Love Your Institutions") warned: "Those who deny any linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the broader crisis" — he was referring to the rampant anti-Americanism of the day — "must pull their heads out of the sand."

Adding to that, a New York Times editorial February 11 regretted: "Mr. Bush has wasted more than six years without coming up with a serious policy for reducing violence between Israel and Palestinians and promoting diplomacy."

Clearly America's to-do list is almost as important in this accounting as the sins it has actually committed.

The consoling news for Americans not working in The White House is that the concern stems from current distrust, rather than from anti-American bias of a more lasting kind. Polling evidence shows that most of the negative opinion is about what America does, as opposed to what America is. Opinions can change, as opposed to convictions, which are more deeply rooted.

Let's say that a new administration does manage to change the approach and performance on most of these issues and tries mightily to broker a lasting land-for-peace deal in the Middle East. What then?

Maybe it isn't really about 'America'

While they object to the actions of the U.S. government, the vast majority of foreigners have retained affection for the American people. A survey taken in 44 countries shows that 43 per cent of respondents regard Americans themselves in a "somewhat favourable light," while 21 per cent look on them "very favourably."

Even in Lebanon, where 81 per cent "oppose the U.S. government," 50 per cent "like" or "love" the American people. Lebanon is typical, moreover, of places where U.S. policy is reviled, but American educational institutions and innovation are admired, and U.S. culture enjoyed.

And consider France's Sarkozy again, in London a few weeks ago: "The French listen to Madonna just as they used to love listening to Elvis and Sinatra. And French parents dream of sending their child to an American university."

This foundation of good will is priceless for American efforts to turn the global opinion problem around.

Moreover, America's "big ideas" have support in key countries. A Eurobarometer poll suggests that 74 per cent of people in the EU consider the promotion of democracy, a key Bush agenda item, an important part of foreign policy, compared to only 51 per cent in the U.S. itself.

On the question of whether the U.S. or the EU should limit its economic relations with China because of human rights concerns, the numbers are virtually identical in the two jurisdictions (the EU, 54 per cent in favour, the U.S., 52).

This like-mindedness offers American policy makers a better chance to redefine "Americanization" in positive terms over the negative meanings attached by anti-globalists and other objectors.

It is a dangerous time in the world. The unique U.S. capacity to project force, in combination with other tools of development, remains invaluable to international security.

The 9/11 attacks, as well as their traumatic effect, introduced new givens into international relations. But despite an initial position of great support for the U.S., the world's public developed a mistrust of current American leaders, judgements and actions.

All countries polled, including Canada, now show significant majorities support a role that is "more independent" from the U.S., as opposed to "remaining as close." (The choice of becoming "closer" barely registers.)

The 21st century was probably not meant to be just America's after all.

But a more outward-looking U.S. that is able to galvanize a more collective form of world leadership has enormous potential to benefit the world at large, and for its own people along the way.