Mideast Dispatches

When I met Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf back in 2003, he appeared in his dark robes with little fanfare. With a few guards, and a couple of handlers at his side, he walked from his home to the humble offices in which we were to speak.

At the last moment, his handlers asked (again) whether there wasn't a male representative of the CBC who could conduct the interview. I answered in the negative, properly attired in a head-to-toe black chador that I was instructed to wear for the occasion.

Muqtada al-Sadr
(Alaa Al Marjani/Associated Press)

I was determined to meet this man. Though it was early going, it was clear that he would be a key player in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. And for 90 minutes, I questioned him, hoping to get to the bottom of his agenda.

Throughout the interview — during which it was difficult for al-Sadr to look me straight in the eye, I think more out of modesty than anything — the young cleric maintained despite the fact that he had formed a militia just a few months earlier that he had no political aspirations in the new Iraq.

Al-Sadr now is a very different man.

Al-Sadr's growing power and influence

For one, he has been in hiding since the new U.S.-Iraqi army crackdown started in February, his whereabouts unknown. His Mahdi Army, though fractious, has become a powerful force. He's also the leader of the parliamentary bloc that determined who would become prime minister of the first permanent, elected government since Saddam's government was toppled.

His influence and power, it seems, has grown, both in the government, and on the streets.

That's why when al-Sadr's six cabinet ministers quit their posts this week, many in Iraq and in the U.S. administration stood up and took notice.

What hasn't changed is al-Sadr's vehement opposition to the continued presence of U.S. troops on Iraqi soil. In our interview, it was the dominant theme.

And now, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's refusal to demand a timeline for a U.S. withdrawal is the ostensible reason for al-Sadr's decision to withdraw his cabinet members, this time for good.

Al-Sadr stakes his position

Al-Sadr owes his power in part to the widespread loyalty to his father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a prominent cleric believed to have been killed by Saddam loyalists in 1999 along with two of his other sons.

His constituency is largely poor, disadvantaged Shia Muslims, who had long been the underdogs under the Saddam government, which were dominated by the Sunni Muslim minority.

But al-Sadr — or, according to reports, the leadership of the movement that he heads — have succeeded in translating that loyalty into concrete gains for themselves, often at the expense of the sitting government of which they are a part.

On April 9, the fourth anniversary of the fall of Saddam's regime, al-Sadr successfully executed what amounted to a display of his street power: he mobilized tens of thousands to a huge anti-U.S. rally calling on the troops to go home.

By holding the rally, al-Sadr and his advisers appeared to be seeking to entrench him as the de facto opposition to a government now suspected of being corrupt and ineffective. Some observers believe they also sought to detract from the fact that al-Sadr had at first approved of the U.S.-led security crackdown, asking his militia, the Mahdi Army, to lay low while U.S. and Iraqi troops swept his stronghold, the Baghdad neighbourhood of Sadr City.

That position angered the more puritanical elements within the Sadrist movement, who are bent on fighting U.S. troops until they leave. His latest tactics appear aimed at quelling that dissension.

Together, the rally and the subsequent decision to withdraw the Sadrist ministers from cabinet, effectively give the impression that al-Sadr is the only Iraqi leader who is acting on the will of the people and that al-Maliki and his government are not.

It's powerful currency at a time when many Iraqis are disillusioned with their government and its apparent weakness, and are growing impatient with a security crackdown that hasn't succeeded in stopping suicide bombings.

The Sadrist ministers said they were withdrawing so that al-Maliki could feel free to appoint ministers purely based on their qualifications, rather than be hampered by political or ethnic quotas that have severely complicated the ministerial selection process and left some ministries in the hands of unqualified people.

They also said, apparently still playing to the Iraqi people, they hoped other political groupings would do the same, for the sake of forming a strong, effective government.

What the withdrawal means

The Sadrists' departure from cabinet could be both a positive and a negative development. It does give al-Maliki flexibility in appointing new ministers — and he welcomed the resignations for that reason.

However, it highlights divisions in the governing coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, at a difficult time for the government — a time when it must focus on fighting the insurgents and the violence that has engulfed the country. Many observers have suggested the tension ultimately threatens the government's agenda, and its ability to reach specific benchmarks required before the U.S.-led coalition starts leaving.

Although al-Sadr's decision reflects his disapproval of al-Maliki's overall agenda, he hasn't relinquished all his political power. The 30 MPs loyal to his movement will stay in parliament, so he will continue to have influence over government decisions.

Now he also has more flexibility in opposing government initiatives. His popularity on the streets, which far outstrips that of al-Maliki, will give him all the backing he needs.

The United States, which advocates the elimination of all militias in Iraq, has pushed al-Maliki to give up his association with al-Sadr, whose militia has at times been a big thorn in the side of the U.S. forces. Al-Maliki has resisted such calls. It was al-Sadr, after all, who catapulted him to power, and has helped him maintain it.

And that's why al-Sadr's decision this week is ominous. The young cleric who at first emerged as a force based simply on his father's name is now a force to be reckoned with. He brought al-Maliki to power, and he could very well take it away. Al-Maliki knows that, and so do the Americans. And observers say that by distancing himself from the government and its failures, al-Sadr has now become even stronger.

It would be fascinating to interview him again.

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