When you think about it for a bit, there is nothing more surprising than this country's avoidance of a significant terrorist attack since 9/11.

Anyone who remembers looking forward nine years ago knows that such a prolonged avoidance did not seem credible. Particularly so as we entered the long, drawn-out combat campaign that was Afghanistan.

This is not just a matter of luck. For terror plots, as in the so-called Toronto 18 and the alleged one that is making headlines now, have been detected and smashed.

What's more, eight years ago al-Qaeda vowed to strike at Canada and there's nothing to suggest that it and other jihadist cells have given up trying.

Nor can it be said that our safety has been due to iron-tight security around the innumerable "soft targets" across this vast land. Parliamentary committees and media inquiries have routinely found glaring gaps in the protection of our ports, airports and power grids.

What it does suggest, though, is that Canadian counterterrorism forces have worked far better than anyone anticipated.

No optimists

Frankly, I never thought our intelligence system had a ghost of a chance of preventing a catastrophic attack on Canada. All the advantages seemed to lie with an opponent that was prepared to sacrifice any number of its own to strike anywhere in the West.

RCMP investigators remove evidence boxes from a home in London, Ont., on Aug. 26, 2010. Police have charged three suspects in what police and court documents say was a terrorism plot that ranged from Canada to Iran, Afghanistan, Dubai and Pakistan. (Dave Chidley/Canadian Press)

I can't recall, earlier in this decade, meeting a single optimist who foresaw a period of calm. During the dire and gloomy autumn of 2001, I spent months interviewing scores of politicians, police, counterterrorism analysts, historians and other experts on global turmoil.

Without exception, all insisted that the question for the next two or three years was not whether Canada would be attacked, but when.

I'm sure most of you have heard that line many times yourselves. Canada would take its awful turn with other Western countries in being hammered.

And when this was said, we were talking serious damage: Bombings in our crowded city centres, leaving, perhaps, thousands killed; and sustained attacks on our economic infrastructure, most especially against those vital links that sustain Canada/U.S. trade.

Highly believable

These were highly believable scenarios and, also, had to be seen against the terrible terror bombings we witnessed in Madrid and London.

Against this threat, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was often viewed as too weak, too inexperienced, too lacking in street smarts, and too disinclined to co-operate with other agencies, such as the RCMP, to be much of a guardian.

Both CSIS and the RCMP had failed spectacularly in preventing the Air India bombing in 1985, as successive inquires have constantly reminded us.

The relevant fact today, however, is that CSIS is at the forefront of a national security structure that, despite its evident flaws, seems to be working better then we dared hope and, given relatively modest funding, perhaps better than we deserve.

CSIS spends less than $200 million a year on salaries and operations. While the force has grown by a third since 9/11, it still stands at only 3,000 personnel, most of them analysts.

At any time, it has only about 700 field agents to watch an average of about 200 "people of interest," not an lavish amount when you consider it takes an estimated 16 to 24 people to cover one suspect around the clock.

Outreach

These same agents are also responsible for "outreach," which is the street-level campaign of CSIS to go door to door in communities that might harbour extremists, appealing for information and support.

A courtroom evidence photo in October 2009 in the Toronto 18 case, shows bags labelled with ammonium nitrate, said to be part of a plot to bomb RCMP headquarters and nuclear-power plants. (Canadian Press)

Within intelligence circles, it is believed that the awareness of being watched can deter some extremists from fulfilling their ambitions and the outreach program is partly to put out the word that CSIS is around.

What seems to be working best, however, is intelligence liaison, despite the relatively small numbers involved.

CSIS is not a police force but an intelligence gathering and assessment service. When it sniffs a plot, the RCMP takes the lead investigative role and can call on any of its 500 or so agents who are trained in counterterrorism.

Both these services are plugged into one of the world's most sophisticated eavesdropping agencies: the super-secret Communications Security Establishment (CSE) with its 1,300 listeners, analysts and decoders.

This big three of Canada's intelligence system — CSIS, the RCMP and CSE — form the core of a highly complex intelligence web that ultimately encompasses 15 federal agencies and departments.

It's not a massive network, certainly by the standards of leading nations. And it has some glaring weaknesses, including the historic absence of a true Canadian foreign intelligence service like the CIA or MI6.

But it may be as large a security network as Canadians want and, of course, it never really operates alone.

Al-Qaeda's folly

For generations, Canada has worked closely with U.S., British, Australian and New Zealand intelligence, plus a few trusted NATO partners such as the Dutch.

All these agencies and forces exchange daily analysis gleaned from an almost unimaginable flood of raw intelligence.

Also, since 9/11, Canada has picked up, for good or ill, well over 120 new foreign intelligence allies, some good and some the stuff of nightmares.

This is due not to Canada's diplomatic clout so much as the central strategic folly of al-Qaeda.

Not content with taking on the U.S. and certain other Western powers, bin Laden's network has struck at any country that displeases its apocalyptic religious mindset — including Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Indonnesia and Russia, in the process creating scores of new enemies anxious to track them down by sharing information they would once have held tight.

In this sharing, the potential for human rights abuse and scandal is high. CSIS is regularly accused of associating too closely with regimes where torture is a given.

Still, there are few demands that we not accept intelligence from these sources that may be vital to Canada's security. The current policy seems to be "stay clear, but listen closely."

The counterterrorist picture at the moment suggests that the West is in a period where successes outweigh failure, despite the persistence of plots.

It would be both arrogant and dangerous to assume Canada's record of avoiding a significant attack can continue indefinitely.

But as this tumultuous decade ticks away, we should on occasion take note of those services that helped us avoid what might have been some truly bad news.