The pilot of a military helicopter that crashed 18 months ago off the coast of Nova Scotia, killing three men, wasn't qualified to be at the controls, a draft report of a military investigation concludes.

The report, which heavily critiques the training that Canada's search-and-rescue pilots receive, was obtained by the Canadian Press on Tuesday.

It probes the July 13, 2006, crash that occurred as a crew of seven aboard a CH149 Cormorant helicopter performed a training exercise off the coast of Canso, N.S. The chopper, piloted by Maj. Gordon Ireland, crashed nose down in the ocean at 120 kilometres per hour, tearing the aircraft in two.

Sgt. Duane Brazil, Cpl. Trevor McDavid and Master Cpl. Kirk Noel died when they were unable to escape from the submerged aircraft. Bazil and Noel were from Newfoundland, while McDavid was from Sudbury, Ont.

The report says Ireland hadn't fulfilled a military requirement to retrain after he took a 90-day leave from his job, and he was "not qualified" to be in the pilot's seat that night.

The report says Ireland's "inappropriate" use of manual flying techniques had overridden an autopilot system that might have allowed the helicopter to gain more altitude.

As the aircraft descended, the co-pilot, Capt. Ron Busch, was not focused on monitoring his flying instruments, the report says.

As well, Capt. Gabriel Ringuette, the air captain in charge of the flight, was sitting behind the other pilots and was out of reach of the controls, a seating arrangement that was permitted but "put too much faith" in the previous experience of the two pilots, the report says.

Ringuette, who had discretion over the roles of the pilots, was unaware that Ireland's qualifications had lapsed, the report says.   

The investigation also revealed that:

• British instructors who train and test Cormorant crews on simulators in England told investigators the Canadian pilots "were performing to a lower level than other operators" around the world.
  
• Internal surveys of crew members found they believed they lacked sufficient flying time because of frequent inspections of the rear rotor half hub and parts shortages, leading to a "steady decline in the overall proficiency."
  
• The Cormorant training materials neglected to detail the autopilot capabilities of the new aircraft. They also didn't provide sufficient information on co-pilot duties.

The draft report does not identify the personnel on board the helicopter, but sources confirmed the identities of the pilot and co-pilot as well as the air captain in charge of the flight.

The military's Directorate of Flight Safety completed the document last April, but it is still subject to revisions by the air force's senior commanders.

A spokesman for the safety agency said investigators will not comment until the final report is released in several weeks.  

Ireland an experienced pilot

Ireland, an experienced search-and-rescue pilot, had been on leave for personal reasons between April 6 and July 5, eight days before the accident.

When he returned to duty, he had flown 10.5 hours, rather than the 30 hours required by military rules, the report says. Ireland was therefore "not current" in his training to fly the helicopter.

The report suggests Ireland didn't know he was breaking the rules, and the pilot charged with checking him did not verify whether more was required of Ireland.

The report says the check pilot considered Ireland a senior officer and assumed he was therefore aware of the rules, which led to the breach of procedure.

Co-pilot lacked experience

Contacted at his new job with the Defence Department in Ottawa, Ireland declined comment, saying he required approval from senior officers before being authorized to speak about the crash.

"At the moment I'd prefer not to talk about it," he said.

A lack of experience was cited in the case of co-pilot Busch, who had spent most of his career flying Griffon helicopters, the Canadian army's version of the Bell 412.

"He [Busch] was still becoming accustomed to the cockpit environment … and had received very limited exposure to some of the basic search and rescue sequences," the report says.

Busch declined comment when contacted in Nova Scotia.

Training issues at Greenwood base in N.S.

On the night of the crash, the Cormorant was conducting a hoisting exercise, a common training manoeuvre in which a helicopter hovers above a ship as someone is lowered down to do a rescue.

During a manoeuvre, the aircraft started to plunge toward the ocean, which was unusually calm, making it difficult for pilots to tell how far they were from the surface, the report says. The reports notes the pilots also did not recognize the looming danger because they "did not reference flight instruments."

The miscues of the pilots were related to training issues, particularly at Canadian Forces Base Greenwood in Nova Scotia, where the ill-fated Cormorant was based, the report says.

The flying course for the Cormorant is partially based on flying methods for the decommissioned Labrador helicopter, "and does not fully emphasize the new capabilities … that the Cormorant's highly capable automatic flight control system provide," the report says.

Because Canada didn't purchase its own simulator, Cormorant pilots are sent to the Royal Air Force base in Benson, England, once every 12 to 18 months.

British instructors have noted Canadian pilots presented "too much variability" on how they manoeuvred the aircraft, set up their displays and handled emergencies, the report says.

The instruction manual for the Cormorant is also "lacking in specifics on how manoeuvres are to be carried out," the report says.